On Catholicism and Nationalism

It's no secret that identity politics have entered the Church in a big way. It seems that very public Catholics from all sides are talking about it: Dawn Eden Goldstein, Sohrab Ahmari, Matthew Schmitz, Faith Goldy, Nick Fuentes, etc.

We see a lot of denunciations and counter-denunciations, disavowals and counter-disavowals. What we don't see much of is serious, articulate discussion of the ideas upon which the issues rest.*

In the hope of facilitating such discussion, I'd like to propose a list of questions. They're obviously heavy on the theoretical side, and this is intentional. I'm not particularly interested in practical applications until universal principles have been sufficiently clarified. As I've said before, a society can endure disagreement in its members with regard to the means whereby the end of society, i.e., the common good, is to be achieved. But where there is fundamental disagreement as to the nature of the end itself, there is, in fact, no society at all. And this is particularly true in the present case.

That is to say, without clarification of these fundamental issues, debate among Catholics over the current political situation becomes pointless and even counter-productive.

I think it's high time for those who enjoy engaging in these issues to get down to brass tacks and tell us exactly what they think the Catholic position is or should be on these questions.

Questions regarding Catholicism and Nationalism

• What is the Nation? What is the State? What is the People?
• How does the Nation differ from the State?
• How does the Nation differ from the People?
• What is Nationalism? What is Civic Nationalism? What is Ethnic Nationalism? 
• How does Nationality differ from Nationalism?
• Is Nationality a natural good? If so, when is the State obliged to respect it? To defend it? To supress or intervene in it?
• Does Catholicism have a preferred State model with regard to Nations and/or Nationality?
• Is Nationality an obstacle or an asset to the proper functioning of the State? To the life of the People?
• What is the Catholic understanding of the Nation-State?
• To what extent, if any, is the modern Nation-State a manifestation of the demise of Catholic Christendom?
• What is the Catholic understanding of the Multinational or Plurinational State?
• To what extent, if any, are Civic Nationalism, Plurinationalism, and Ethnic Nationalism at odds with each other? To what extent are they compatible?

*NB: I exclude Dr. E. Michael Jones from this accusation. Unfortunately, his work is so politically charged  - in the age of political correctness, one can say "toxic" - that few public Catholics are willing to seriously and thoughtfully engage with it, and are instead happy to summarily dismiss it as "fringe," "cranky," or "antisemitic." Their loss, frankly.

Catholic Church and Christian State, Pt. 2

Part I | Part II

The Power of the Church in Worldly Matters

 by
 Cardinal Joseph Hergenröther

§1. Three Theories on this Point

In relation to the power of the Church in temporal matters were formed three systems based upon the notions expressed in the Decree Novit, upon the idea prominent even in the first ages of Christianity that the spiritual power was above the temporal, and upon the theory and practice of the Middle Ages:

• the system of the direct power of the Church in matters temporal;
• that of the merely indirect power;
• that of the merely directing power.

§2. Direct Power of the Church in Temporal Matters (Potestas directa Ecclesiae in temporalia)

The main doctrines of this system were as follows: God has given to the Pope, as His Vicar, endowed with the unlimited power of binding and loosing, authority to rule the world in temporal as in spiritual matters, but in such manner that the spiritual power is to be wielded by him in person, while the civil power is to be delivered over to princes, who in reality are merely servants of the Church, receive their power from her, are responsible to her, and - in case of misconduct - may be deposed by her. Thus, the Pope comes to be the supreme head in spiritual and temporal matters, to whom, as Vicar of Christ, the King of kings, all nations and kingdoms are directly subject, and earthly kings must in turn be his representatives.

This opinion, strongly combated by St. Robert Bellarmine, was held by Henry of Segusia, Cardinal Bishop of Ostia, Augustinus Triumphus (1320), Alvarus Pelagius (1340), and others. The learned John of Salisbury (1159), who is in some respects considered as the first defender of this system, has by no means made use of the strong expressions employed by late upholders of this view. His opinion seems to have been shared by St. Thomas Becket.

§3. Direct Power is Untenable

The large majority of theologians have perceived this doctrine to be untenable, and have proved it in detail to be so. They point out that, though Christ is possessed of all power in heaven and upon earth, and though the Pope must be regarded as His Vicar, still this vicariate extends over the religious domain only, and includes no unlimited temporal sovereignty, although the temporal sovereignty of a determinate district has been advantageously united with it. Unbelieving princes do not belong to the fold of Christ (John 21:15 seq.), and the Church has in general no jurisdiction over unbelievers (1 Corinthians 5:12); the Pope would most surely not appoint heathens as his vicars.

Neither are the keys of earthly kingdoms committed to the Pope, but those of the Kingdom of Heaven; so that Christian rulers, by the acceptance and introduction of Christianity, have not forfeited their sovereign power, and Christ, who bestows the heavenly, does not deprive them of their earthly kingdom. Were the Pope a universal ruler, the bishops would necessarily be everywhere rulers in their own cities and dioceses; the practical consequences of this doctrine prove its absurdity.

The Popes have never laid claim to any such power, but have, on the contrary, fully acknowledged the jurisdiction of temporal princes. Even Innocent III, to whom men love to attribute the most exorbitant pretensions, distinguished perfectly between his complete and unlimited spiritual jurisdiction and his limited temporal power. The Popes, when claiming the care of the heavenly and earthly kingdom, have never said that the two were subject to them in precisely the same manner; and in maintaining the superiority of the spiritual power they have still never said that temporal power must everywhere and in all cases be subject to it, or that the temporal had its origin in the spiritual. Some are astonished at the saying of Innocent III, that Christ gave to St. Peter the government not of the whole Church, but of the whole world, but in this he surely said nothing more than had been already said by Eugenius III, that Christ had delivered to St. Peter the rights of the earthly and of the heavenly kingdom. The point which Innocent desired to prove was, as the whole context shows, that the primacy of the Pope has no territorial limits. The power of the Pope extends to all Christian lands, not merely on earth, but also in heaven; by this is meant spiritual power only, of which it had been before said: "Power is given to princes on earth, but to priests in heaven also."

§4. Indirect Power of the Church in Temporal Matters (Potestas indirecta in temporalia)

The second system, which has the largest number of followers, teaches that the Church has direct spiritual power, but no direct temporal power; she is appointed to govern the faithful in the supernatural way of salvation; spiritual matters alone are in themselves subject to her, and in worldly matters she takes no part. In so far only as temporal matters are opposed to the supernatural end, or are necessary fur its attainment, has the Church to concern herself with them, and to exert her power. She has in that case to correct and to guide the worldly power and, if necessary, to chastise it when it turns aside from the right path of divine law, hinders the attainment of the supernatural end, and endangers the stability of religion and of the Church. Neither the Pope nor the Church can directly depose a prince, but they can where the highest interests of religion are concerned declare the duty of obedience towards him to have ceased. A prince, bound by oath to maintain religion, who has broken this oath by apostasy or by persecution of the Church, who hearkens to no warnings and despises ecclesiastical penalties, may not be dethroned by his people, for this would strengthen and justify all rebellion; but the people must be declared free from their oath of allegiance by sentence of a General Council or of the Head of the Church.

This indirect power of the Church in matters temporal in general, and in relation to the dethroning of princes in particular, is not a temporal but a spiritual power. It is exerted in matters temporal only in so far as they intrench upon religion, and in this way cease to be purely temporal. Thus Innocent IV said that the Church passed judgment in a spiritual manner on temporal matters (spiritualiter de temporalibus); and in his contest with Frederick II he declared that he was making use not of the temporal but of the spiritual sword. Some theologians have attributed to the Pope in certain cases power to depose a prince; but the distinction is rather in the words than the matter; they required the same conditions, and merely took the consequences of the act for the act itself; instead of the power of declaring the right of sovereignty forfeited, they supposed him to have the power of deposing (potestas deponendi instead of potestas declarandi). In general, it was held that all things temporal were to be directed towards eternal goods, and that earthly goods were to be used with a view to the heavenly, otherwise they would be merely abused.

At first, the title "indirect power" appeared to many strange and contrary to the common teaching; and for this reason St. Robert Bellarmine's book putting it forward was placed on the Index under Sixtus V; but before long, the conviction spread that the matter of the book was sound, and that the expression "indirect power" was well-chosen; Urban VII therefore, in 1590, had the book erased from the Index.

§5. Bellarmine's Teaching

St. Robert Bellarmine treats of the indirect power of the Church in a triple application:

1. quantum ad personas;
2. quantum ad leges;
3. quantum ad judicia.

In relation to persons (1), he teaches that in an ordinary way, as judex ordinanus, the Pope cannot depose temporal princes as he can bishops, but can only, in virtue of his right as head of Christendom, dispose of all things necessary to the salvation of souls. All the schoolmen were agreed upon the main point, that in case of threatened destruction to faith and the exercise of religion, or where the preservation of the Church is concerned, this power may be exercised, especially in a case of apostasy from the faith.

In relation to laws (2), the Pope, as Pope, cannot release from civil laws or abolish the laws of temporal princes except only when it is necessary for the good of souls, or when an existing temporal law is dangerous to salvation, and when at the same time princes refuse its repeal.

As judge (3) he can pass sentence in temporal matters only when absolutely necessary for the salvation of souls.

§6. Grounds for this Opinion

In further support of this opinion, the following proofs were brought forward: Christian princes form, as is universally allowed, part of the flock of Christ confided to St. Peter (John 21:15); the charge of them consists in so leading them that they may attain eternal salvation. But how can they attain it if the supreme pastor has not the means either of leading back erring sheep to the fold or of hindering the rest from going astray? This he cannot do if he is forced to look on while a prince is raging unpunished against the Church, and leading or forcing the subjects bound to him by oath away from the true religion into error. The Pope must take the necessary steps against him by censures, and if his obstinacy require it, also against those who obey his evil orders, and who have dealings with him in his official position. In case of extreme obstinacy, which is made a condition by all theologians, the Pope may declare the oath taken to a prince to be no longer binding, for the purpose of moving him to amendment. No oath binds in such a way that it cannot be loosed if it endangers the salvation of souls, and no end may be preferred before the highest and last end of man.

§7. Indirect Power Always Used by the Church

The Church, even in the earliest times, exercised an indirect power in temporal matters. How was it else that she forbade the faithful to undertake and administer certain employments and offices prejudicial to the welfare of their souls, and that later, when persecution had ceased and the danger was lessened, she still required ecclesiastical approval for the administration and exercise of such offices and professions, though they were no longer prohibited? Christians who held the post of city duumvirate, and were thus brought into close contact with heathen rites, had to remain away from church during their year of office. Under Constantine, however, the Synod of Arles (314) directed that Christian praesides were to bring with them into their provinces letters of communion from their bishop, and only in the event of their acting contrary to the laws of the Church were they to be cut off from communion by the bishop of the place in which they were holding office. By an exercise of the same power, persons performing public penance were excluded from civil as well as military offices (militia togata et paludata), and even when it was over, these offices might not be resumed under pain of perpetual exclusion from them. It is manifest that the Church has ever had the right of imposing public penance upon Christians, however high their dignity; from the penance it resulted that such persons forfeited their office and dignity; and thus, in an indirect manner, she deprived them of temporal power. The well-being of private persons was not more important in the eyes of the Church than that of Christian princes; she imposed penances upon the one as upon the other, even when they were not voluntarily under one. This is one of the earliest forms in which the indirect power was exercised. Again, in time of persecution, the Church enjoined upon the faithful flight and complete withdrawal from contact with the heathen world; and this flight was permitted even when forbidden by the heathen rulers, and although public burdens were thus avoided ; and in this way she interfered indirectly in the domain of the State. This was indeed only a conditional and provisional measure; but the same is true of all other cases of indirect interference, which only continue so long as the danger exists, so long as the sinner refuses amendment, so long as is required by the all-important end of the salvation of souls.

§8. Teaching of the Fathers

The Fathers laid it down as a rule that all public temporal regulations are to be observed which are not a hindrance to religion or contrary to the commandments of God. In case of danger to salvation, all is to give way, according to Matthew 16:26, 5:29. He who is charged with the guidance of the faithful in the way of eternal salvation must be able to know and to set aside the hindrances to salvation. The preservation and furtherance of spiritual goods, which is the charge of the Church, requires from time to time the sacrifice of some earthly good or interest, and therefore the power entrusted with earthly and temporal interests must give way before the power entrusted with spiritual and eternal interests. Civil society rests upon the observance of natural law, distributive justice, and freedom of intercourse. By an abuse of power, legitimate authorities may become illegitimate; when this happened, nations threw off such authorities in virtue of the judgment of the Church; and what she did was not by her own power to set aside a rightful sovereign, but, when a sovereign had become illegitimate, to declare him to be such.

§9. Cardinal Turrecremata

Cardinal Bellarmine is usually spoken of as the originator of this doctrine; but before his time, the majority of theologians taught the same. Cardinal Turrecremata of the Dominican order (died 1468) states two opinions:

1. the Pope has power in spiritual matters alone, and not in temporal, with the exception of that which the Church has acquired by the gift of the faithful or of princes;
2. the Pope, as Vicar of Christ, has full jurisdiction over the whole earth in matters spiritual and temporal.

The cardinal himself holds neither of these opinions, but teaches, in accordance with the system spoken of above, that the Pope has jurisdiction in temporal matters only so far as may be necessary for the preservation of spiritual goods in himself and others, or so far as is required by the needs of the Church or the duty of the pastoral charge in the correction of sinners. If it be objected from Scripture that Christ had no worldly power, and desired none, and that therefore His Vicar has none, the answer is:

1. that no such power is, in itself, ascribed to the Pope;
2. that to our Savior is given all power in heaven and on earth. He is the King of kings. Lord over all, and this even as man; but He did not avail Himself of His power because He came to be an example of humility and poverty.

Before Pilate, Christ expressly declared Himself to be a king; He did not say that His kingdom is not in this world, but only that it is not of this world; He was but declaring the high origin and sublimity of His kinghood. When Christ paid the tribute for Himself and Peter, it was not most surely done because it was due, but to avoid scandal (Matthew 17:26). In driving the buyers and sellers from the Temple, Christ exercised the spiritual power, which extended to earthly things, since He paid no regard to the worldly loss of those whom He expelled.

§10. This Teaching is the Most General

The more closely the ancient theologians are examined the more clear does it become that Bellarmine and the Jesuits - who were moreover especially admonished to keep, if possible, to the common teaching of the theological schools - were not introducing any new doctrine, but were on this point completely in accordance with the other religious orders. The teaching of the great theologians of the Middle Ages - St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, and others - differs in no essential point from theirs. The Dominicans in the time of Bellarmine taught the same; e.g. amongst others, Francis Victoria (died 1546) says:

The Pope in matters temporal may not interfere with the civil power, unless where there is danger of grievous loss to souls.

Precisely the same was taught by theologians of various nations, religious orders, and positions, throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; the same again in the eighteenth, although these controversies were then shortly supplanted by others of quite another type.

§11. Attacks upon Bellarmine's Teaching

On comparing the expressions of Bellarmine and the Jesuits who succeeded him with those of more ancient theologians, it will be found that, far from seeking to render the prevailing view more strict, these later theologians strove rather to modify it; not only did they, in opposition to the theory of a direct power in matters temporal, defend the merely indirect power, but even to this they put many limitations. Bellarmine was attacked on either side: by some, he was blamed for granting to the Church too little power; by others, especially by Anglicans and Gallicans, for granting her too much. The earlier French writers had disputed the direct power only, as may be seen in the controversy under Boniface VIII, who, as they supposed, desired to reduce France to the condition of a feudatory kingdom; the later writers since the seventeenth century disputed the indirect power also. Until 1615, this was still considered the prevailing doctrine; but the sentence (afterwards revoked) passed by the Paris parliament in 1610 condemning Bellarmine's work, On the Power of the Pope in Matters Temporal against William Barclay, was followed by the censures of the Sorbonne in 1626 on the Jesuit Anthony Santarelli and the Dominican Malagula for the same doctrine; and the first of the four Gallican articles of 1682 rejected altogether any power, whether direct or indirect, on the part of the Church in the civil government of kings and princes.

§12. Objections

Various objections have been brought forward against the indirect power:

1. The highest civil authority was from the beginning a lawful power; it had its origin in God, and could lose nothing of its power by the institution of the ecclesiastical hierarchy: Christ Himself tells us to render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's (Matthew 22:21).
2. Moreover, the early Popes and bishops had no thought of exercising any such power: the Fathers were all in favor of obedience, even to apostates such as Julian, who was obeyed by Valentinian, except in matters relating to the heathen superstition: they excommunicated princes and authorities, but never so much as thought of deposing them.
3. The system of indirect power brings with it the direct, for which it serves as a mask. All cases would become subject to the Pope, primarily, indeed, heresy and idolatry; but from the eleventh century, simony was called heresy, and covetousness also is idolatry (Ephesians 5:5); incapacity was likewise made a reason for deposition. The rule which held good for princes must also hold good for individuals; and all temporal matters without distinction must be subject to the Pope, since it is easy to make out that any temporal matter has connection with the spiritual end of man.
4. The consequences of this doctrine are such as to disturb the peace of princes and people, to put an end to security in the administration of justice, and even to endanger the life of the ruler; since, if a deposed ruler desired to regain his kingdom by force, his murder would be considered allowable.

§13. Replies

To these arguments the following replies have been made:

1. The sovereignty, even of heathen princes, may be lawful, and as such even Christians are bound to render it obedience in all things not contrary to conscience. Civil authority is, within its own domain, independent, and may exist without the Christian religion, but never on so true and firm a basis as is given to it by Christianity. The power bestowed by Christ upon the Apostles includes that of feeding the flock, and the power of the keys, under which head must be reckoned the right of excommunication, and the loosing of oaths injurious to salvation.
2. It by no means follows that because at a certain time no use was made of a power, therefore the power was not in existence. The Church may have had many reasons for not proceeding against apostates such as Julian: in the first place, the impossibility of effecting any good, and the danger of increasing the evil, for Julian was in full possession of power; then again the short period of his reign, and the at least apparent justice shown by him in the beginning; the fact also that Julian did not himself pass and publicly enforce laws directly contrary to Christianity; that he did not compel its abjuration, and that he did not make the profession of Christianity, but pretended crimes, the pretext of his frequent barbarity. Moreover, Christianity had not as yet penetrated so deeply into the life of society as to have affected the whole of civil legislation. Where censures would fail of their effect - the amendment of the offender - and would even be the cause of evils still greater, it would seem mere prudence to abstain from the most severe punishments, and rather to suffer the existing evil.
3. Between the two systems, that of direct and that of indirect power, there is the widest distinction: the first gives to the Pope a real sovereignty in temporal matters; the second imparts to his spiritual power in certain cases only a decisive influence, which has certain results within the civil domain. If excommunication brought with it, as a natural consequence, the forfeiture of earthly sovereignty, the Church would have direct power in temporal matters, and not merely indirect; but for this last, it suffices that the Church should act upon the subjects in such manner that loss of power to the ruler ensues; as by release from the oath of allegiance, which does not of itself necessitate the withdrawal of obedience. Moreover, the power of the Pope is primarily restricted to the case of crimes endangering religion, to which class belong all the known historical cases.
4. As to the consequences of the doctrine, the Pope can by no means, at his own pleasure and on every occasion, depose princes; he is able only to declare in what cases citizens are released from the oaths taken to them; for such princes as are the cause of extreme danger to religion and the salvation of souls deprive themselves of their rights by their own acts. Since judgment on these points cannot be passed by individuals or by nations, this doctrine rather serves as a safeguard to rulers and a restraint to subjects. The Pope leaves to the dethroned prince, as long as he gives prospect of amendment, the hope of regaining his kingdom; therefore, that this hope may be realized, the Church is bound to protect and defend him against his subjects.

No theologian has ever ascribed to the Pope power over the lives of princes; and permission granted for their murder is inconceivable. Bellarmine expressly says:

It is unheard of that the murder of a prince should ever be permitted, even were he a heretic, a heathen, and a persecutor, and even were monsters to be found capable of committing such a crime.

§14. Teaching of the Jesuits

Even those Jesuits who are said to have boldly developed this doctrine to its uttermost consequences have defended the indirect power alone. Louis Molina discusses the question whether Christ, as man, was temporal king and lord of the whole earth, and lays down the following propositions:

1. The Pope has no temporal power of jurisdiction of such kind as to make him lord of the whole earth; the kingly power is altogether distinct from that of the Pope, and in their own sphere kings are independent. Hence, in the ordinary course of things, it does not belong to the Pope to appoint or to depose kings; the Pope has not power directly to decide purely temporal disputes between princes.
2. Although the Pope has general jurisdiction over the temporal goods of the Church, still he is not lord over them, but administrator and director, and may not therefore dispose of them at will, but only on prudent grounds for the benefit of the Church.
3. To the spiritual power of the Pope, bestowed for the supernatural end, is united the highest and most extensive power of temporal jurisdiction over all princes and other subjects of the Church, in so far as if required by the supernatural end, for which the spiritual power was ordained.

Hence the Pope can, if it be required by the supernatural end, depose princes and deprive them of their kingdoms. He can also decide between them in temporal concerns, invalidate their laws, and amongst Christians order all things, not anyhow, but in the way recognized according to wise judgment as absolutely necessary to the general spiritual welfare, and may enforce his commands not merely by censures, but also by public punishments and by force of arms, like any other temporal prince; although it is for the most part more suitable for the Pope to do this not of himself, but through temporal princes. In this sense is the Pope said to have both swords and both powers, the spiritual and the temporal. This doctrine was based on the ordinary grounds. Again and again was it pointed out that the Pope, as a rule, was to make use of the spiritual power alone, and only where this proved insufficient, or where there was danger in delay - thus only in extraordinary cases - was he to draw the temporal sword.

The same is taught by Salmeron, who opposes the direct power, defends the indirect, and, like Molina, appeals to Dominicans, such as Turrecremata, Victoria, and Soto. Anthony Santarelli defended the indirect power alone, although in a more emphatic form; the other religious orders, the secular clergy, and the jurists, maintained the same doctrine; it was, moreover, defended by the Sorbonne. It was only on the 8th of May 1663, after many intrigues on the part of the parliament and the court, that a declaration was passed to the effect that the Pope has no authority in the temporal concerns of kings, and that subjects could in no case be dispensed from the allegiance due to the king. This was based upon former royal edicts, sentences of the parliament, and declarations of the Sorbonne, which, however, merely declared the independence of the French crown; and this had been before acknowledged even by the Popes. Shortly after the Declaration of March 19, 1682, on June 10, 1683, the Inquisition of Toledo, in opposition to it, condemned as erroneous and schismatic the proposition:

The Pope or the Church have neither direct nor indirect power in the temporal concerns of kings, and these cannot be deprived of their dominions; nor can their subjects, upon whatsoever ground, be pronounced free from their oath of allegiance.

The Dominican Carena pronounced even impious and heretical the opinion of the Calvinists and the Magdeburg Centuriators, who denied to the Pope any power, direct or indirect, in matters temporal. As this was a question of a doctrine universally defended in the schools, the Jesuits, especially in their delicate relations towards the Dominicans, could not, without the gravest reasons, have taken a different view; moreover, they followed always the common teaching of the schools.

§15. Directing Power of the Church in Temporal Matters (Potestas directiva)

Other theologians, as a modification of the theories described, taught that the Church has only a directing power (a guiding but not a constraining power) over civil authorities; that is to say, it is her right and her duty, by doctrinal decisions, by warnings, declarations, counsels, and commands, to enlighten the consciences of princes and people; to remind them of their duty towards God and religion, to instruct them as to the scope and limit of their duties, and in case of a collision of duties to pass judgment as to what is to be done to satisfy God and conscience. Therefore, she must be the judge of human laws which contradict the divine law, she must strive for their improvement when dangerous to salvation, satisfy inquiries in cases of conscience, and when her voice is unheeded she must defend herself to the utmost against the evils arising from this neglect.

Numerous early examples were brought forward in support of this view: e.g. the conduct of the great Pope Gregory I, who endeavored to obtain from the Emperor Mauricius the withdrawal of a law injurious to the interests of religion. Gregory approved the first clause of the said law (of 592), by which active State officials were not to undertake ecclesiastical offices; the second clause, by which these same officials were not to become monks, he desired so far modified as that they should be obliged first to render account of their service, and in general to fulfill all former obligations; the third clause, by which all military persons were entirely prohibited from taking holy orders, he rejected, as closing to many the way of salvation.

Looking at it from this same point of view, Bossuet also considered the much-discussed reply of Pope Zacharias as to the accession of Pipin in the light of a counsel given by the Pope, and not a command.

§16. Relations of this Theory to the Preceding

In accordance with the expression of Gerson and Fenelon, this power has been called a directing or guiding power (potestas directiva et ordinativa); but it is a matter of dispute whether Gerson's directing power is not the same as that called by others indirect power. Gerson teaches that the Church is so to restrain her power within limits as to acknowledge also the independence of the civil power, so long as the civil power is not by an abuse made the means of attacking the faith, blaspheming God, and openly oppressing the power of the Church; should such be the case, it becomes the duty of the Church to guide and direct the civil power. But has anything essentially different been maintained by the supporters of the indirect power? Have they placed other limits to the independence of civil authority? And is not this a question rather of words than of things? The word may be better chosen, but the thing is essentially the same. There is, however, a distinction between Gerson and Fenelon: Gerson speaks of a superiority, a dominion, of the spiritual power, in case of abuse of the civil power; Fendlon allows only a directing power, consisting mainly in instruction and counsel. The question remains as to how far this last power may go, and what are its limits. These limits are determined by Fenelon and Gosselin chiefly according to prevailing public law and according to special legal titles, which were frequently united with ecclesiastical titles in the person of the Pope; consequently, the exercise of this directing power must necessarily differ at different times, and regard must be had to contemporary circumstances and legal relations; its expression and its consequences will differ, while its fundamental principle - supremacy in all questions affecting religion - necessarily remains ever the same. The Head of the Church will ever have the right of judging whether, and how far, religion is injured by this or that civil law; thus the principle remains, though the form in which it is carried out may vary with the times.

In principle, the doctrines of the indirect and of the directing power do not in all points differ widely. Let us consider them under Bellarmine's three heads:

1. In respect to persons (quoad personas): it is universally admitted that the Head of the Church may admonish and correct princes guilty of crime, and, with a view to their amendment, may lay them under censures. As to the deposing of princes in extreme cases, the defenders of indirect power, far from making the doctrine that princes might be deposed stand and fall with their general theory, do not even make this doctrine a necessary and abiding expression of the indirect power; while the defenders of the directive power limit deposition to the one case where the public law of the country in question authorizes it; in such a case both theories agree that the Pope can declare the right of governing to have been forfeited. According to the teaching of both parties, it belongs to the Pope, under certain conditions, to declare non-binding the oath of allegiance, and this in virtue of the rights of the Church, since he is the supreme guide of consciences within her. On this point, however, a controversy exists as to whether the condition of belonging to the Catholic Church, which in the Middle Ages was attached to the election and accession of the sovereign, rested, as the defenders of the indirect power believe, upon the natural law, or only upon the positive human law, as is held by Fenelon and the upholders of the directing power. It would follow from the first of these opinions, that at the present time the deposition of such princes would be justified, even though not absolutely commanded; according to the second, the right of deposing would cease when not sanctioned by the public law of the land in question. Theologians have not yet come to an agreement upon this disputed question.
2. In respect to laws (quoad leges): surely in common fairness the Church has at all times the right of declaring any given State law injurious to the interests under her charge; precisely as the civil power may declare the same of a law of the Church. As a matter of fact, and as we now experience, the State not only makes this declaration without real cause, but proceeds to measures grievously injurious to the Church. When civil laws are such as to endanger salvation, the Pope, as Head of the Catholic Church, has without doubt the right to declare them to be such, to denounce them emphatically; and if denunciation be fruitless, to proscribe them as powerless to bind the conscience; he is indeed as much bound in duty to this as were the Apostles and first bishops to prohibit the faithful from taking part in the serving of idols, and from obeying those commands of the State which they could not fulfill without betraying God. However hard it may from circumstances become for the Pope, he is still bound by the sanctity of his office to condemn whatsoever is contrary to the faith and morals of the Church, and to declare with apostolic freedom that the Church, far from justifying such laws, is ever bound to reject them.
3. In respect to sentences (quoad judicia): the Church's right of judgment is inseparably united with her right of legislation. The same power which enables her to pass laws within her own domain enables her also to apply them, and to watch over their application. When a question comes before her judgment-seat which has relation to the supernatural end under her charge, she has full power to pass judgment; and temporal matters also fall under her control, when and in so far as they relate to the fulfillment of her great charge. Here again the words of Cardinal Antonelli apply: "The Church has received from God the sublime charge of guiding men, whether as individuals or united in societies, to a supernatural end; thence comes her power and her obligation of passing judgment upon all matters, whether inward or outward, in their relation to the natural and divine laws. But since every action, whether commanded by a higher power, or proceeding from the freedom of the individual, is necessarily invested with this character of morality and justice, it follows that the judgment of the Church, as it is directly concerned with the morality of the action, extends also indirectly to all things with which this morality is bound up. But the Church does not therefore directly interfere in political matters, which by the ordinance established by God, and by the teaching of the Church herself, come within the domain of the civil power, and are completely independent of any other authority."

§17. Superiority of Ecclesiastical over Civil Legislation

If, indeed, Stahl were in the right when he wrote that one or the other must be the case: either the Pope must have indirect power in temporal matters, or princes must have indirect power in spiritual matters: there is no third alternative (which, however, many would by no means allow) - the question may fairly be asked: Which is most supported by Christian and historical principles, which is most profitable to the free development and the highest interests of mankind: the indirect or directing power in matters temporal maintained by the earlier theologians, or else the direct or indirect power of the State in ecclesiastical matters defended by the later legists and regalists? In the present day only one case of practical importance can occur, that of a contradiction between a positive civil law and a law of the Church. In our day, laws are often passed by party intrigue, hastily, intended to last only a short time, with corrupt aims, and often with the sacrifice of general to individual interests; thus in many cases the medieval saying might be applied, by which laws were likened to the behavior of Anacharsis with the cobweb. Is it not plain that the legislation of the Church, based as it is upon high principles, is far superior, and that it might easily become her duty to encounter these modem laws wit' the words, "This is unlawful for thee to do," or "Non possumus"? Or is the Church indeed at one time to approve the French laws of 1789, at another time those of 1793, then the Code Napoleon, then the Prussian Landrecht, and then again the Swiss Federal Constitution as at present revised? In so doing, she would cease to be herself, she would destroy her very being, she would no longer be the Bride of the Lord. But the State, which is only negatively bound to demand from the faithful nothing contrary to conscience, and which has moreover in almost all lands guaranteed liberty of conscience, would contradict itself should it disallow this right of the Church. If, in watching lest the State suffer injury (ne quid detrimenta respublica capiat), civil rulers consider themselves entitled to pass judgment on the laws of the Church, and to subject them to their Placet, they cannot deny that the rulers of the Church are in the same way bound to watch lest any injury be done to souls; and that although they may on their side oppose no Placet to that of the civil power, it is nevertheless the right and the duty of the Church rulers to declare that such and such a State law is contrary to the conscience of Catholics. Can it be that at the very moment in which a dogma of the Church is declared to be dangerous to States, the right of the Church is to be called in question of at any time declaring on her side a law of the State to be dangerous to the conscience of the faithful?

Catholic Church and Christian State, Pt. 1

Christ gives dominion to Pope Gregory XIII and Philip II of Spain

Part I | Part II

The Doctrine of the Superiority of the Church

 by
 Cardinal Joseph Hergenröther

Throughout the Middle Ages, it was maintained as a doctrine that two powers have come down from God, the spiritual and the temporal, both indispensable to mankind, and appointed to work together in peace. Concord between the two was recognized as the foundation of the well-being of peoples and kingdoms, and discord as their ruin.

The Church and State, distinct in aims and means, in extent and compass, are nevertheless to work together for the well-being of mankind, mutually supporting and aiding one another. But although both powers are coordinate and independent in their own domain, still a certain order of precedence must exist between them, since they do not precisely coincide; and in case of conflict preference must be given to one over the other; and in this case, the preference was given to the Church. Let us now examine more closely, first, the doctrine of the superiority of the Church, and second, of her authority in matters temporal.

§1. The Pre-Eminence of the Church as Maintained by the Fathers

The doctrine of the superiority of Church over State is by no means a specialty of the Middle Ages, as has often been asserted. It belongs rather to the Patristic Age, and was defended by the Fathers of the Church. Thus, St. John Chrysostom says:

The Church is above the State, in the same way as the soul is above the body and heaven above the earth, and indeed far more.

Gregory of Nazianzen unites the two comparisons when he says to those holding civil dignities (dynasts and archons):

Take not amiss my freedom of speech: the law of Christ subjects you to my power and to my throne; for we bishops also exercise a sovereignty, and, moreover, I add, a greater and more perfect sovereignty; or is perchance the spirit to be inferior to the flesh, the heavenly to the earthly?

St. Isidore of Pelusium writes:

The government of the world rests on kinghood and on priesthood: although the two differ widely - for one is as the body, the other as the soul - they are nevertheless destined to one end, the well-being of their subjects.

The sovereignty exercised by bishops is, according to him, more sublime and more arduous than that of kings. The dignity of the priesthood is expressed by St. John Chrysostom in yet another way:

Those who are rulers on earth have indeed the power of binding, but it affects bodies merely; but the priestly power of binding touches souls, and penetrates heaven; what priests do here below is confirmed by God above, and the judgment of the Servants is approved by the Lord (John 20:23; Matthew 18:18). What power can be mightier? All judgment has been given by the Father to the Son (John 5:22); and I know that the disciples receive all judgment from the Son; a power as much exalted above earthly power as heaven above earth and the soul above the body.

This figure of the body and soul was employed also in the Middle Ages. Precisely similar to the image of heaven and earth is that of the sun and moon, made use of by Popes Gregory VII and Innocent III, and by many other writers. Moreover, the words of Pius IX, so ill-received by the public press, in which he said that the Church was stronger than heaven, are used by St. John Chrysostom.

§2. The Figure of the Two Swords

The figure of the two swords is also much used in the Middle Ages. Abbot Godfrey of Vendôme employs it even before St. Bernard, to whom Bossuet ascribes its first use, but not with quite so wide an application. The spiritual and the material sword were both to serve for the defence of the Church; and the material sword was to support the spiritual. Bishop Hildebert of Mans, when unjustly kept prisoner by the Count of Perche, wrote to Bishop Herlo:

Most surely it was not without reason that two swords were found on the Apostles (Luke 22:38), since both are still to be found on the members of Christ's body; as the priest is a member of Christ, so likewise is the king. I am speaking to one who has knowledge; thou knowest the meaning of the sword of the king and the sword of the priest: the first is the penalty imposed by the courts of justice; the second, the severity of Church discipline. If any one would set me free with the sword of the king, I would not ask that on my account the sword of the priest should be drawn.

Frederick Barbarossa appealed to Hadrian IV on the precise ground that it was to these two swords that God had delivered the government of the world. According to St. Richard, Archbishop of Canterbury, these two swords seek mutually for aid, and the one lends to the other its own power. Other writers also make use of this figure; and in Gratian may be found a passage imputed (though questionably) to Pope Nicholas I, in which the bishops of Gaul received an order to force plunderers of Church property to make restitution, both by the spiritual and material sword. Innocent III also employs the figure to point out the necessity of mutual support between the two powers, which in a certain sense complete each other. Thus, in 1208 he called upon the King of France to unite his sword with that of the Church, for the chastisement of evildoers, since the spiritual and material sword have to aid each other.

§3. St. Bernard

Even stronger are the words of St. Bernard, in which he calls upon Pope Eugenius III to draw the two swords, which both belong to Peter: one to be drawn at his command, the other by his hand, as often as is needful. In his great work dedicated to the same Pope, he says:

He who denies to thee the (material) sword does not seem to have weighed sufficiently the words of our Lord, "Put thy sword into the scabbard." It is thy sword, and is to be drawn on a sign from thee, although not with thine own hand. For if it in no way belonged to thee, the Lord of the Apostles, when they said to Him, " See, here are two swords," would not have made answer, "It is enough," but " It is too much." Both swords therefore, the material and the spiritual, belong to the Church; the first to be drawn for the Church, and the second by the Church.

According to St. Bernard, the material sword belongs, in the first place, to civil rulers; but it must in any event be used according to the advice and counsel of the Church. It does not belong to the Church absolutely, but only in a certain sense, and in so far as it is bound to give her aid, to support and defend her. The figure is meant to show forth, in the first place, the necessary harmony of the two powers, and also the principle that earthly power has for its end the well-being and furtherance of the kingdom of Christ. John of Salisbury, and many other writers, teach the same thing; the Emperor Frederick II also employed this figure in the same sense, and many Popes have done the same.

This teaching was opposed for the first time in the fourteenth century by the champions of the civil power, who maintained that the allegory had no weight as proof; that it might easily bear quite another meaning; and that even supposing the two powers to be intended by the two swords, it by no means necessarily followed that both belonged to St. Peter, or to any other Apostle.

§4. The Material Sword in Defence of the Church

The principle is the same set forth by the Fathers, that God has given power to emperors and kings that they may serve His kingdom, cooperate in the aims of the Church, and promote the worship of the Almighty, and that earthly kingdoms may serve the cause of the heavenly. Gregory the Great expresses this in a letter to the Emperor Maurice:

For this end has power over all mankind been bestowed by Heaven upon the piety of my sovereign, that those who strive after good may be supported, that the path to heaven may be widened, that the earthly kingdom may serve the heavenly.

In the same way, Leo the Great warned the Emperor Leo that the imperial power was not given him merely for the ruling of the world, but also for the protection of the Church. No thought is more prominently put forward by the Fathers than that of the civil power (the material sword) being intended for the protection and furtherance of the Church. Thus, Bishop Ivo of Chartres writes to King Henry I of England:

We admonish your highness, with urgent entreaties, to suffer the Word of God to be preached without hindrance in the kingdom entrusted to you, and to be ever mindful that the earthly kingdom must be always subordinate to the heavenly kingdom, entrusted to the Church.

Paschal II (April 2, 1117) writes to the King of Denmark:

Power is lightly used when the eye is fixed on God, by whom it has been bestowed. Therefore, have God ever before thine eyes; and as thou hast received power from God, strive ever to please Him through His grace. Honor the churches and priests of God, in joy and humility; protect orphans and widows; be active in administering justice, and repress with thy might all who strive against it. Suffer not any one to plunder the goods of the Church, for this is a crime of sacrilege, and for such guilt thou art responsible; since it must not be that what is bestowed for the good of many should be plundered by the violence of one. In the repression of this crime and others, let the bishops of thy kingdom be thy fellow-workers, supporters, and helpers. The world is well governed when the priestly power acts in concert with the kingly. 

§5. Utterances of the Popes

The superiority of the spiritual power has also been set forth by the Popes. Thus, Pope Gelasius wrote to the Emperor Anastasius:

There are two powers by which the world is principally governed: the consecrated authority of the bishops and the authority of the king. Of these two, the burden of the bishops is the heavier, since they have to render account for kings themselves before the judgment-seat of God. If thou, by thy dignity, hast precedence amongst men, still must thou bow thy neck in obedience to ecclesiastical superiors; thou hast to direct thy course according to their judgment, not to lead them according to thine own pleasure. Still more hast thou to submit to the Bishop of the Roman See, set over all by the voice of Christ, and ever acknowledged with reverence as her head by the Church.

Pope Symmachus declares to him:

If thou be a Christian prince, thou must hearken patiently to the voice of every bishop. When the dignity of emperor is compared to the dignity of bishop, the difference between them is as great as between the charge of things human and of things divine.

Gregory IV impressed upon the Frankish bishops that the charge of souls, a bishop's office, is higher than the imperium, which is merely temporal. According to Ambrosiaster, nothing like the episcopal dignity is to be found; compared to it, the splendor of kings and the diadem of princes are as lead to gold. Treating of this, Erasmus of Rotterdam himself says:

Weighed in a just balance, no king is so exalted, in virtue of his kingship, as not to be beneath the dignity, I will not say of a bishop, but even of a simple pastor of souls, in virtue of his pastoral charge.

Gregory VII observes:

In the hour of death, no one calls for the assistance of an earthly king, but for that of a priest; priests are the fathers and teachers even of kings and princes, and Constantine himself considered them as his judges; indeed, a simple exorcist has greater power than civil rulers; for the exorcist has sway over devils, while rulers often obey them.

§6. The Pre-Eminence of the Church as Defended in the Middle Ages

Throughout the Middle Ages, and long afterwards, the pre-eminence of the Church over every earthly kingdom was uncontested. It was recognized that the order or rank of societies differed according to their end or aim; that the end of the Church was the higher, indeed the highest conceivable, and that the temporal must be subservient to the spiritual. The principle put forward by St. Augustine was maintained, i.e. that without true justice, which is the foundation of kingdoms, no government can endure; but that true justice exists only where the true faith reigns, where Christ is king. It was remembered in the Middle Ages that the Fathers had set forth the insufficiency of political and social institutions, and had referred the Bible prophecies concerning the kingdom of David, and the eternal kingdom never to be overthrown, to the Church. The words of Holy Scripture as to the chastisement of the mighty who despise the law of God were ever before men's eyes (e.g. Wisdom 6:2, 10), as were the passages as to the passing nature of all earthly power and greatness (e.g. Ecclesiastes 1:1 seq.); and they were used to see the first place conceded to the kingdom of God above all others.

§7. The Independence of Church and State

It is the teaching of theologians and canonists that, although the political power of sovereigns is the highest of its kind in all that concerns the material aims of life and the well-being of society, and is in its own sphere second to none, still it by no means follows that in all which relates to a more sublime end it has not been subjected to another power. From a Christian point of view, the end of the State is not the final and most lofty; it is inferior to the end of eternal salvation; the natural order is surpassed by the supernatural. The Church ever sets before men the highest end; and it is precisely by their ends that the relation of various societies to each other is determined.

Earthly well-being, which it is the duty of the State to promote, is for the Church merely a means to her own end, the attainment of eternal salvation for her members. So long as it is not denied that this life is to be referred to a future life; so long as the immortality of the soul, and the final destiny of man beyond the grave, are maintained; and so long as it is conceded that the aim of the Church is to prepare and direct mankind for this destiny, it must likewise be conceded that, in questions relating to the higher end, eternal salvation, the civil power must be subordinate to the spiritual, even as the end of the one is subordinate to the end of the other.

But in things temporal, the dependence of the Church upon the State is often felt most pressingly; according to Pope Nicholas I, Christian emperors, in order to attain eternal life, stand in need of the Pontiffs, while they, on their side, make use of the imperial laws in earthly matters. This mutual need brings with it a matual dependence in all things which extend beyond the distinct province of each power.

§8. The Distinction Between the Powers of Church and State

Nevertheless, the Church being a direct institution of God, while the State has been only indirectly instituted by God, the Church once more takes precedence; she has, moreover, greater firmness and endurance, wider extension, more influence both on the heart and actions of men. Even French Councils pronounced the higher dignity and pre-eminence of ecclesiastical over civil power; and as late as the beginning of the seventeenth century, this was a received principle with all Catholic authors. Whether the civil power owed its origin to the ecclesiastical was indeed disputed, but never that it was beneath the ecclesiastical in dignity.

§9. The Rejection of the Separation of Church and State

From a Christian point of view, the superiority of the Church is seen to be all the more needful from the fact that otherwise the true relation between the two orders, the natural and the supernatural, would be wanting. Seen in the light of the Catholic faith, the separation of Church and State, lately become a principle, is the tearing of the world from God, of the creature from the Creator, the turning away of society from its highest end; the dividing and dismembering of each individual, by separating the characters of churchman and citizen, in a way opposed to the nature of things, and which entails endless collisions of duties, being contrary to the text, "That which God has united let not man put asunder" (Matthew 19:6).

In practice, it presents immense difficulties, things temporal and things spiritual not being always easy to divide; for the points of contact and connection between the religious and civil domains are endless, and the boundary line has not in all cases been discerned, much less determined. According to one able French writer:

If the Church were merely an institution for prayer, and the State for police; if religion confined itself entirely to speculative opinions, mystical feelings, and secret meditations, while the State had to do only with the good order and cleanliness of cities and streets; if the spiritual sphere comprehended only the innermost relations of each soul to God, the temporal only the prevention of misdeeds and plunder among men; it would then indeed be easy to separate completely two spheres which would neither have, nor be likely to have, any points of contact, and to preserve freedom to two powers knowing nothing of, and never coming across, one another. But facts overturn all these imaginary barriers and boundary lines. Religion is by no means a hermit enclosed in a cell; neither is the State contented with the part of a district policeman or beadle. Both powers aim far higher, and as yet, even without overstepping the sphere transmitted and belonging to each, neither of the two have been able to stir a step without being brought into mutual contact.

Everywhere in life they come across one another, and the one can neither avoid nor ignore the other. This being the case, it cannot be but that one should honor the other as superior. Even if it does not follow, as was maintained of old, from the principle of unity in the government of the universe, that two powers, not merely distinct, but, moreover, entirely independent of each other, cannot by possibility exist side by side, it may still be seen from their actual relations, that either the State must guide the Church or the Church the State; a mean between State supremacy and a so-called theocracy is no longer conceivable. Since earthly well-being is to lead to heaven, all else must be subordinate to man's final end; and the rulers of Christian States, as believers, being bound by the same duties as their subjects, a Catholic State cannot avoid acknowledging the superiority of the Church, and must necessarily look upon it as a healthful and strengthening influence, as a safeguard of its own welfare and prosperity.

§10. The Inability of the State to Fulfil the Highest End

Christianity of necessity brought with it a change in the conception of the State. The State is no longer a final end to which, according to the ancient idea, individuals must devote themselves, and personal rights be sacrificed; on the contrary, individuals have essential aims, independent of the State, which they may never sacrifice to it. To them, the State is not above all else, but is subservient to the institutions ordained for the salvation and highest destiny of mankind.

Christianity may thus seem to have withdrawn from the State a portion of its dignity, but it has in reality increased it. According to the Christian conception, the State is an ordinance of God for the maintenance of peace and justice, a figure of the moral government of the universe in this lower world. The majesty and power of rulers is based upon their receiving a charge from God, and being His representatives; and it is their calling to do all in their power for the increase of God's kingdom, and the training of man for his supernatural destiny.

§11. The Protestant Defence of the Superiority of the Church

Let us hear a professor of Protestant theology. The ecclesiastical privy councillor of Baden, C. B. Hundeshagen, writes:

Within the pale of Christianity, there is no point of view from which it is not accepted as a certain truth that heaven is superior, earth inferior and subordinate; that the salvation of souls is incomparably above all earthly well-being; that the majesty of holiness is immeasurably beyond all other majesty; that aid in attaining heaven, in the very nature of things, takes precedence of any kind of aid towards the end of this earthly life. This is and will ever be the Christian view of life. It is absolutely inconceivable that, so long as Christianity exists, this view of life should ever cease to exercise its influence upon the hearts and minds of men. Striking practical proof in support of this assertion is given us in the fact that the destiny of man for something higher than this everyday world, and that which it brings with it, has so completely taken possession of the mind of all ages of Christendom, that even such times and societies as have long ago got rid of all thought of "the undiscovered country from whose bourn no traveler returns," still have not been able to free themselves from a remnant of Christian idealism. In many regions of the great world of civilization, as is well known, there often remains, of that which constitutes the real meaning of Christian hopes and aspirations, merely a dull colorless deposit. It is nevertheless acknowledged that spirit is above matter, the soul higher than the body, the world of thought more exalted than the world fashioned by our hands; that the ideal, though invisible, and merely an object of faith, takes precedence of all that is visible to our eyes, that may be felt, that stands before us and flatters our senses, that is the object of sensible experience. It is not necessary, for this, to mix with men of a higher stamp; in most cases, even those of a coarser nature will confess that, in theory at least, above money and land, above property and pleasures, above the loaves and fishes of this earthly life, stand ideal goods: conscience, honor, freedom, right, love, truth, art, and science. They will at least allow that such a view of the world, if perhaps not "practical," is still "beautiful." This remnant of idealism has still, there can be no doubt, a certain value. Reverence for the sublime, the noble, and the beautiful, in contrast with the mean and the base, forms most surely a notable point of union between the un-Christian civilized world and the Christian, with its high conception of things sacred. It is at the same time a testimony of the permanent influence of the Christian view of life, even in such regions as have in all else rejected the Christian view; and in this respect it is a remarkable sign. Suffice it to say that the magic by which New Rome won the hearts of men to her system of the government of the State by the Church was no other than this sense of ideal good so strongly and universally awakened in mankind by Christianity.

And this, forsooth, is called theocracy!

§12. The Scope of the Church's Power as Taught by the Popes

Theocracy, in this sense, can never be uprooted; it is inseparably bound up with Christianity. It is the ideal of Christians truly filled with faith and trained at the same time in mind. It will make itself felt amid all forms of human development as long as men have faith in Him who has said:

Heaven and earth shall pass away, but My words shall not pass away.

But even among Christians, it is an ideal but seldom, and in part, realized. In a sense, it is the same as with Christian perfection and the Evangelical Counsels. The heathen of old, especially Julian the Apostate, made sport of them, above all of Matthew 19:21, as impolitic and conducive to the ruin of human society, which could not exist together with them. Amongst other answers it was urged in reply that though, of course, perfection was to be desired for all, still as a fact it was not to be found in all, while virtue had ever fewer followers than vice, and wealth found more supporters than poverty. But supposing the luxury of life, the search and pursuit of earthly pleasure, the serving of mammon completely done away with, all society would be raised, ennobled, and transformed into a more sublime community. In the same way, were an end put to all wars,were all laws molded upon the eternal justice of God, the supernatural everywhere preferred to the natural, and all spiritual claims satisfied, the pathway to the Church triumphant would be thrown open for the Church militant, and earth would be the antechamber of heaven; a true kingdom of God would arise, not indeed rendering earthly kingdoms superfluous, but raising them to a higher unity.

Christ did not set aside His counsels because few were found to follow them, and in like manner the ideal of the truly God-fearing State, because it can be but seldom and approximately realised, is not therefore to be passed over in silence, and this all the less because, from a religious point ofview, it is here not a question of a counsel merely, but of a duty. For as the individual has to subject himself to God and to His revelation, so also has society, domestic as well as political, the family as well as the State. Christ has given to the community the same way of salvation as to the individual f and as the body has its life from the soul, so the soul has its life from God, in whom we live and move and have our being. The admonition, "Seek first the Kingdom of God and His justice, and all these things shall be added to you" (Matt. 6:33), applies as much to the community as to individuals; earthly blessings will follow after.

Some there are who deny the divinity and sovereignty of Christ, and withdraw their necks from His yoke; but the King and Lord of all things does not therefore cease to possess this sovereignty; His right and His majesty are in no way impaired by this disobedience. Christ is and must ever be the King of kings, and the Church is His Kingdom, to which all are bound to belong.

§13. The Ideal of the Truly God-Fearing State

The practical consequences arising from the superiority of the Church are by no means such as have been deduced from it,that is to say, it does not follow that the whole domain of civil rule devolves upon the Church; never has she claimed for herself so unlimited a competency. The Popes themselves, when engaged in the decision of weighty questions, have fully set forth the limits of their power. This is the case, for example, in the Decree of Innocent III Per venerabilem (1202). The Pope here clearly and emphatically expresses his high respect for the authority of temporal princes. Count William of Montpellier had petitioned the Pope to legitimatize his illegitimate children, and amongst other examples appealed to that of the French King Philip Augustus. Innocent thereupon made answer: 

The King of France, since he acknowledges in matters temporal no superior, could, without violating the rights of a third party, submit himself to our judgment, as he actually did; some may even think that he himself in his own person might have given the dispensation, not as a father to his own children, but as a prince to his subjects. But thou (William) art, as thou knowest, subject to other princes; hence perhaps thou couldst not submit thyself to us without prejudice to them if they should withhold their consent; and thy authority is not such as to give thee personally in such cases the right of dispensation.

§14. The Decree 'Novit'

Here also mention must be made of the celebrated Decree Novit, called forth by a complaint made by the King of England against Philip Augustus of France. The feudal relation between the continental possessions of the English kings and the crown of France had often led to disputes and wars, always most disastrous, but especially so in the time of King John of England. The murder of his nephew Arthur was universally laid to his charge; and, at the suit of the Duchess Constance, Prince Arthur's mother, and of the nobles of Aquitaine, the French king summoned John before the feudal court to make his defense. John neither appeared himself nor sent representatives. The court of French peers declared him guilty of felony, and his feudal estates in France forfeited. Philip Augustus, with a strong force, invaded Normandy, and took one by one all John's continental possessions. John, unable to withstand his enemy, applied to the Roman See, complaining that the King of France had violated a sworn treaty, had begun the war before the expiration of the time agreed upon, and had violently seized from him his dominions. These incessant feuds between great kings were, as Alexander III had before declared (September 6, 1173), most displeasing to the Holy See, especially as they harassed and divided the powers of Christendom, and thus rendered impossible all joint undertakings, especially Crusades. Innocent III, who had not been remiss in admonitions and warnings, and had made unceasing efforts to keep peace between the two kings, sent the Abbots of Casamario and Tre Fontane as legates to induce them to lay down their arms and make peace, and the rights of each party being reserved, to lay that country under an interdict whose ruler should refuse compliance. The legates were sent to both princes, who were admonished to put an end to the war. The letters of the Pope, in which similar words are used to both kings, show an equal sense of his own duty, and of the respect due to their high dignity. He says:

Since it is well known to thy kingly highness that with us there can be no respect of persons, we are convinced that thou wilt not take it ill if even towards thee we fulfill the duty of our pastoral office, lest, together with the offence against the Divine Majesty of which negligence would make us guilty, our office may incur the censure of men by our omitting in the case of kings and princes something of that which ought to be done, making more account of their wishes than of their well-being. The word of God in our mouths must never be bound, but must be wholly free, that we may freely correct the turbulent, and as often as is profitable fulfill the word of the Apostle, which applies to us all the more the higher the office held by us in the Church.

John, in the midst of so many difficulties, was ready to submit, even though the bitterest truths were told him; but Philip Augustus, who had no wish to be deprived of his victory, first delayed his answer, then deliberated with his council, and at last replied that, in matters of fiefs and vassals, he was not bound to render account to the Pope, who had moreover no concern with the disputes of kings. Thereupon, the Pope wrote back to Philip that nothing more nearly concerned his pastoral charge than the admonishing of Christian princes to keep the peace, that he might thereby hinder pillage, sacrilege, and other evils arising from war; that the King of England had complained to the Holy See of grievous injustice suffered at the hands of Philip, by reason of which, having in vain sought redress, he had turned to the Church; to her the king must perforce hearken, since it was a question involving grievous sin. The Pope wrote in detail on the same subject to all the bishops of France in 1204, setting forth the right and justice of his interference. Hence arose the celebrated Decree Novit.

§15. The Judgment of Innocent III

Innocent declares that he has the honour and well-being of the King of France so much at heart that he considers the exaltation of his kingdom as the exaltation of the Holy See, and that he was far from intending in any way to injure him; that, burdened already with duties beyond his strength, he had no thought of encroaching upon the jurisdiction of the king, and neither would the king desire to do anything to the prejudice of the Pope's jurisdiction; that he had merely made use of the spiritual jurisdiction possessed by the Church (Matthew 18:15-17); that when brotherly admonition and correction before witnesses were fruitless, the sinner was to be brought before the judgment-seat of the Church, and, if found guilty and wanting in submission, was to be cast forth and treated as the heathen and the publican; that the right of correction, even in the case of Christian princes, had ever been inherent in the Church; that he had no intention of judging in a question of fiefs, but in a question of sin, to censure which was beyond doubt the duty of the Pope; that, moreover, this was a case of treaties of peace confirmed by oath and broken before the appointed time; and that it was the duty of the Church to take cognizance of oaths.

The principle of the Decree is that directly the Church has to pass judgment as to the violation of the moral law, indirectly as to the temporal matters involved. The Pope was not directly concerned in the execution of the sentence of the French feudal court, nor in the sentence itself, but grievous offences against the moral law fall under the judgment of the Head of the Church, who has power to proceed against the culprit with spiritual punishments. This is a power given not by men but by God, the power of binding and loosing given to St. Peter and affecting all Christians without respect of persons; even kings are subject to it, and all the more because, with this exception, they acknowledge no superior. The Pope has not to speak of temporal matters as such, and can only touch them indirectly when they are connected with a violation of the moral law. The Pope in this case is merely a subsidiary judge.

This was the principle applied by Alexander III in a question as to legitimacy when appeal was made from a temporal judge to the Roman See, and by Honorius III in the dispute as to the right of succession of the Queen of Cyprus. Innocent accurately distinguishes the question of civil law from that falling within his own jurisdiction. In the particular case before us, King John had brought Philip's offence under the notice of the Church, and had offered to come forward himself as a witness. Philip, as the Pope admonished him, should now have called to mind the example of pious princes, such as the Emperor Valentinian, who desired ever such a supreme pastor as would recall him to the right path by his rebuke, when he through human frailty erred. Theodosius II and Charles the Great directed that, if one of two contending parties desired to lay his case before the Church, he should be suffered to do so. The promotion of peace was the Pope's unquestioned duty; a short time before it had been beneficial to the French king; and since he had himself desired the Pope to mediate for peace with Richard Coeur-de-Lion, he had no just ground for now withstanding a like endeavor.

But beyond the question of the truce came that of its confirmation by oath, upon which the Church had an acknowledged right of judgment. The Pope could not appear to favor such a state of disturbance between the two kings, or to lean to one side rather than the other. His legates were to move the King of France to make a new treaty, or failing this, in conjunction with the Archbishop of Bourges, to make inquiry into John's grievances. John sent no representative to the Synod held by the legates at Meaux in 1204, while the French prelates appealed to the Pope. The Pope received the appeal, though he would not hold them bound by the obligation they had undertaken of obeying the summons within an appointed time under pain of suspension; he was satisfied with the attendance of a few. Those who made their appearance were the Archbishops of Sens and Bourges, the Bishops of Paris, Meaux, Châlons, Nevers, and other ecclesiastics; they defended the right of their king, and were prepared, in case they had fallen under suspicion, to undergo canonical purgation. The Pope released them from this, and took no further steps on the side of John, who again had sent no representative to Rome. By 1206, John had lost his dominions on the Continent. When, in 1205, the Bishops of Normandy inquired of the Pope whether they were to take the fidelitas demanded by the French king, i.e. the oath of allegiance, Innocent III replied that they must judge for themselves according to their knowledge of the circumstances, and that he could give them no answer on the subject.

§16. The Ability of the Church to Judge Sin

The Decree Novit was everywhere, even in France itself, accepted as part of canon law. In 1329, Petrus Bertrandi, at that time Bishop of Autun, set forth these principles in the name of the clergy before the officers of the crown, making appeal to this very Decree; the same had been done before by the renowned Augustinian Aegidius of Rome, Archbishop of Bourges (died 1316), who defended the jurisdiction of the Church in mixed matters in the sense of the Decree; even the author of the Somnium Viridarii (c. 1382), though so little in favour of ecclesiastical claims, maintains the same; the differences of opinion mentioned by him scarcely affect the material question. St. Bernard also taught that, in certain contingencies (incidenter) and for cogent reasons, the Church may intervene in temporal matters, and the same has been taught by the majority of theologians since his time.

But this did not imply that all temporal power was delivered over to the Church, or that the two powers were blended into one. The Church punished crimes which fell under her cognizance with spiritual penalties, while the State came in with temporal penalties. The State dealt with temporal cases inquisitorially and by means of its officials; the spiritual power only after a denunciation, or by reason of the publicity of the guilt, in so far as lay within its domain. The Church, whose aim was the amendment of the offender, only punished the obstinate (contumax), who, in spite of all warnings, did not amend; the State punished those who had done wrong, even when they had repented of their crime. The chastisements of the Church were intended to heal the soul (medicinal), and not primarily to expiate the crime (vindicative). But the Church could not justly punish unless the sin was proved; she must take cognizance of it. Therefore kings, though subject to no vindicative punishment, and having in matters temporal no superior over them, were still not free from the spiritual power and from the healing punishments of the Church in case they sinned publicly and with grievous scandal, or misused their power to the injury of religion and of souls.

It did not follow that every question of law could be brought at pleasure before the spiritual court under pretext of grievous sin; if fraud (dolus) were proved, the spiritual judge was bound to refuse to hear the question in dispute. Moreover, the competence of the civil judge, when real, did not cease because the Church also took cognizance of the case of a Christian guilty of public and grievous sin.

In the next installment, we shall examine the authority of the Church in temporal matters.